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A Relic of McCarthyism:
Question 21 of the Application for Admission
to the New York Bar
COLIN A. FiEMAN"
INTRODUCTION
n the Spring of 1991, after passing the New York State Bar ex-am ation, I began preparing my application for admission to the
bar. As part of the application process, I completed and submitted a
personal questionnaire, formally titled "Application for Admission to
the Bar and Statement Required Pursuant to Article 94 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules," to the Committees on Character and Fit-
ness ("the Committees").' For the most part, the application seeks
general information about the applicant's education, residency in
New York, and financial history. Question 21 of the application
(Question 21), however, reads as follows:
* J.D. Columbia Law School 1990. The author is an assistant district attorney in the
New York County District Attorney's Office. The views expressed in this piece are those
of the author and not necessarily those of the District Attorney's Office.
The author wishes to thank Carol Elewski, James M. McGuire, Paul Shechtman, and
Ronald J. Warfield for their assistance in preparing this article.
1. Civil Practice Law & Rules Article 94 regulates admission to legal practice, and
Rule 9404 provides that the Appellate Division can prescribe a "statement or question-
naire to be submitted by the applicant." In addition, Rule 9401 provides that "the appel-
late division in each judicial department shall appoint a committee ... for the purpose of
investigating the character and fitness of every applicant for admission to practice," in-
cluding review of the applicant questionnaire. After completing an investigation, the
Committees determine whether an applicant is "entitled to admission," and forward their
admission recommendation to the Appellate Division. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R § 9404
(McKinney 1981). The Appellate Division, in turn, reviews the Committees' recommen-
dations and renders admission decisions. See also Arthur H. Schwartz, What is a Charac-
ter and Fitness Committee, 49 N.Y.ST. BAR J. 302 (1977); Matter of Brennan, 230 A.D. 218
(N.Y. 1930).
Section 53 of the Judiciary Law provides that the Court of Appeals has ultimate
authority over the admission of attorneys. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 53 (McKinney 1983). See also
Matter of Shaikh v. Appellate Division, 39 N.Y.2d 676 (1976). Section 520.10 of the Rules
of the Court of Appeals requires, among other things, that an applicant submit proof of
good moral character to the Committees and § 520.10(c) of the Rules vests discretion in
the Appellate Division in each department to "adopt for its department such additional
procedures for ascertaining the moral character and general fitness of applicants as it
may deem proper." As discussed infra, those procedures and the Appellate Division's ad-
mission determinations pursuant to these rules are subject to review by the Court of Ap-
peals. See also, Frank S. Smith, Admission to the Bar in New York, 16 YALE L.J. 514
(1907) (for a history of New York bar admission procedures).
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Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of any
organization or group of persons which, during the period of your mem-
bership or association, you knew was advocating or teaching that the gov-
ernment of the United States or any state or any political subdivision
thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any un-
lawful means? If your answer is in the affirmative, state the facts below.
Although by the time I prepared my application I had forgotten
much of the constitutional law I had learned in law school, I knew
that there was an extensive body of federal constitutional law, par-
ticularly First Amendment law, dealing with loyalty oaths and in-
vestigations. After first reading Question 21, I concluded that it was
probably a permissible exercise of the state's power to regulate the
practice of law, despite what I believed was the obviously anachro-
nistic purpose of the question. Moreover, I expected that there would
be judicial authority dating from the McCarthy era upholding the
validity of questions like Question 21.2 After some research, I found
the relevant United States Supreme Court decisions, including a
number of decisions dealing specifically with bar admission inquir-
ies. I was surprised to learn that Question 21 violates the First
Amendment.
The Supreme Court has long held that free speech and associa-
tion are fundamental and "preferred" constitutional rights2 In a se-
ries of three bar admission cases-Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,4 In
re Stolar,5 and Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond---the
Supreme Court held that while a state may investigate the back-
ground of bar applicants to ensure that they are persons of "good
moral character," the First Amendment requires that questions
about political advocacy or prior associations asked for that purpose
be narrowly tailored. Specifically, such questions must be expressly
2. Between 1950 and 1954, Wisconsin Senator Joseph R. McCarthy spearheaded
congressional investigations into Communist activities in the United States. McCarthy's
investigations were marked by "abuses of governmental process, procedural rights, civil
liberties and civility," and his name became synonymous with a period of virtual national
hysteria over internal security and the menace of Communism. JAMES M. BURNS AND
STEWART BURNS, A PEOPLE'S CHARTER: THE PURSUIT OF RIGHTS IN AMERICA 289 (1991)
[hereinafter BURNS]. As one historian has noted, "all issues of the day" were pervaded
with "the increasingly obsessive quest for a standard of loyalty which was constantly on
the verge of being translated into a requirement of political conformity." WILLIAM F.
SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY
173-74 (1970) [hereinafter SWINDLER]. See BURNS supra, at 268-302 (brief history of the
constitutional and political crises arising from "post-war pre-occupation with national se-
curity"); ROBERT GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE SENATE
(1970); ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL (1983).
3. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
4. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
5. 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
6. 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
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limited to determining whether an applicant ever had the "specific
intent" of acting violently or illegally. Since Question 21 asks about
an applicant's "knowing membership" in a group advocating gov-
ernment overthrow without focusing on the applicant's specific in-
tent during that membership, it is overbroad and violates the First
Amendment's guarantees of free speech and association.7
Overbroad inquiries about political opinions and activities, es-
pecially when backed by the potential sanction of professional dis-
qualification, are unconstitutional because they may inhibit the ex-
ercise of free association and political speech which are at the heart
of the First Amendment's guarantees.' The mere possibility of denial
of admission to the bar for having espoused a political view or asso-
ciated with a group that meets with the Character Committee's dis-
approval may be enough to discourage prospective bar applicants
from fully exercising their First Amendment rights. This "chilling ef-
fect" which flows from the State's requirement that applicants an-
swer Question 21 renders that question unconstitutional.9
In addition, Question 21 affects more than the constitutional
rights of individual applicants to the bar. State regulations which
target or inhibit the free exercise of First Amendment rights by
members of the legal community may be especially troublesome,
since lawyers must at times represent the interests of people whose
views do not conform to popular opinion. To the extent that Question
21 is a means for state enforcement of political uniformity among
members of the bar, those members may not reflect the full spec-
trum of political values and may be less inclined to represent un-
popular views. Hence, not only are the constitutional rights of bar
applicants implicated by this question, but ultimately so are the
rights of those individuals who require the service of zealous advo-
cates who will not hesitate to represent unpopular positions for fear
7. A state may require an applicant to subscribe to "oaths, addressed to the future,
promising constitutional support in broad terms." Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 681
(1972). The state is simply limited, as discussed infra, in investigating an applicant's be-
liefs or associations, or withholding admission to the bar because of those beliefs or asso-
ciations.
8. See generally N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1962), ("Because First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the
area only with narrow specificity."); note 46, infra. See also Nicholson v. Judicial Com-
mission, 50 N.Y.2d 597, 607 (1980). In Nicholson, the Court of Appeals noted that "the
rights of political expression and association are at the heart of the First Amendment."
Although, as the Court stated, not every interference with those rights violates the con-
stitution, significant restrictions on First Amendment rights may be sustained only "'if
the state demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedom.'" Id., quoting Buckley
v. Valeo, 425 U.S. 1, 25 (1975).




After studying the Supreme Court's decisions and thinking
about these issues, I was confronted with a serious dilemma. I was
anxious to be admitted to the bar, not only because I had invested
considerable time and resources in my legal education, but also be-
cause I had started work as an assistant district attorney and could
not appear in the grand jury or at trial until I was admitted. At the
same time, I was deeply troubled by the prospect of having to an-
swer a constitutionally impermissible question in order to gain ad-
mission. After all, the very purpose of the admission process was to
ensure that I was willing and able to uphold the law and the Consti-
tution. Indeed, the oath I would take upon admission to the bar
would include an express promise to uphold the Federal and New
York State Constitutions.10
It was impossible for me to reconcile the purpose of the Charac-
ter Committees' investigation, and my own responsibilities as a pro-
spective attorney, with answering Question 21. In my mind, answer-
ing the question would mean that from the outset of my legal career
I was willing to tolerate without protest unconstitutional state ac-
tion. Therefore, I decided that the proper course of action was to
decline to answer the question, and cite the relevant Supreme Court
authority. In doing so, I was hopeful that the Character Committees
and the Appellate Division would recognize and respect the legal
basis for my response. This confidence was bolstered by my belief
that any real governmental interest in rooting out "subversives" was
a thing of the past.
I was wrong. Some weeks after submitting my application, I
was interviewed by a member of the Committees on Character and
Fitness for the Second Judicial Department. The Committees mem-
ber and I discussed the constitutionality of Question 21, and he
asked me to submit a letter explaining my position in greater detail.
After a few more weeks, I was informed that the Committees had
forwarded my application to the Appellate Division, without a rec-
ommendation or findings about my character, for that Court's deci-
sion of the constitutional issue I had raised. Six months later, the
Appellate Division referred my application back to the Committees,
without decision, for their resolution. After approximately six more
weeks, I was informally told by a committee member that my appli-
cation had again been sent to the Appellate Division, this time with
10. Attorneys, upon admittance to the New York State bar, take the following oath:
"I do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of New York and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of an
attorney and counselor at law to the best of my ability." N.Y. JUD. LAW art. 15, § 466;
N.Y. CONST. art. 13, § 1.
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a favorable recommendation for admission." Soon thereafter, the
Appellate Division summarily denied my application with leave to
renew. The Court's memorandum decision stated: "We find that the
applicant's refusal to answer Question 21, which we deem to be a
proper question, constitutes willful obstruction of the legitimate
function of the Committees to inquire into an applicant's character
and fitness to practice law."'2
In light of the relevant case authority I believe that the Appel-
late Division's decision was error. Question 21 is not a constitu-
tionally "proper" question because it makes no reference to specific
intent. Moreover, legitimate constitutional objections to the question
do not constitute "willful obstruction."13 Question 21 must, therefore,
be rewritten to include the necessary specific intent element or,
preferably, be removed from the application altogether. In the
meantime, applicants should not be denied admission to the bar for
refusing to answer Question 21.
Part I of this article will summarize two United States Su-
preme Court cases, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners'4 and
Konigsberg v. State Bar,5 involving due process challenges to bar
admission inquiries about advocacy and associations. These cases
were decided by the Supreme Court before it reached the underlying
First Amendment issues, and were largely subsumed by the Court's
decisions in Baird, Stolar, and Wadmond. Nevertheless, these deci-
sions place the later First Amendment decisions in context, and also
establish that Question 21 implicates independent and important
due process considerations.
Part H of this article will discuss the bar admission cases de-
cided on First Amendment grounds, and Part III will discuss the
significance of the specific intent element. These sections will focus
on the balance struck by the Supreme Court between the state's in-
terest in regulating the practice of law and the First Amendment
rights of bar applicants. In weighing these interests, the Supreme
Court drew upon fundamental principles of First Amendment law
developed in a series of cases involving prosecution of "subversive
activities" and loyalty oaths. In particular, the Court's requirement
that states limit bar admission inquiries about an applicant's advo-
cacy or associations to his or her "specific intent" during the advo-
cacy or association is a result of the Court's efforts to limit the sweep
11. Notably, the Character Committees confirmed that the delay in processing my
application was not based on any reservations about my "good character" or fitness to
practice law.
12. In re Fieman, No. 6193N (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
13. See infra, text accompanying notes 109-11.
14. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
15. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
1994]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of state investigations that had resulted in some of the worst abuses
of power of the Cold War. The Wadmond decision represents the
merger of these First Amendment principles with the Court's earlier
efforts to address, on due process grounds, the problems posed by
state investigation of bar applicants.
Finally, in Part IV, I will briefly discuss the results of my own
challenge to Question 21 and the lack of procedural safeguards for
bar applicants who contest admission decisions. Although the Su-
preme Court has held that a bar applicant must be afforded a formal
opportunity to be heard before he or she is denied admission to the
bar, New York does not provide for such a hearing. This omission
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The potential consequences of
this procedural failure are perhaps best evidenced by my lack of an
opportunity to present the arguments summarized in this article to
the Appellate Division before it denied my application. Had there
been a hearing, the Court would have been in a better position to
appreciate the implications of upholding the constitutionality of
Question 21, and may have reached a different decision consistent
with the controlling Supreme Court authority.
I. THE DUE PROCESS CASES
Before it addressed the First Amendment implications of bar
admission inquiries about advocacy of government overthrow and
membership in subversive groups, the Supreme Court decided two
due process challenges to bar admission proceedings. These cases
laid the constitutional groundwork for later First Amendment chal-
lenges. In the first case, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners," the
petitioner's application for admission to the New Mexico bar was
denied for lack of "good moral character" based on his membership
approximately fifteen years earlier in the Communist Party and his
arrests, but not conviction, for "suspicion of criminal syndicalism"
while participating in labor strikes.17 In reversing the denial on ap-
peal, the Supreme Court first noted that "[a] State can require high
standards of qualification such as good moral character or profi-
ciency in its law before it admits an applicant to the bar."1 8 A state
can demand these qualifications because attorneys act as officers of
the state's courts and the state has a substantial interest in protect-
ing the public from unscrupulous attorneys and ensuring that it re-
16. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
17. Id. at 237.
18. Id. at 239. For a discussion of whether the good moral character requirement is
itself vague, overbroad, and unconstitutional see Michael D. White, Note, Good Moral
Character and Admission to the Bar: A Constitutionally Invalid Standard?, 48 U. CIN. L.
REV. 876 (1979).
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ceives competent legal services. 19
At the same time, the Court held that "any qualification must
have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice law."20 Historically, courts had considered admission to the
bar and the practice of law a "privilege," subject to such conditions
as the state saw fit to impose.2 1 Further, applicants for admission to
the bar had borne the burden of offering at least prima facie proof of
their qualifications for admission.22 In Schware, the Supreme Court
took a somewhat different view. The Court allowed that an applicant
must demonstrate his or her qualification for admission, but went on
to note that the practice of law "is not a matter of the State's
grace."' Although the Court did not decide whether the practice of
law is best characterized as a "right" or a "privilege," it concluded
that the petitioner was entitled to admission because he had made a
"forceful showing of good moral character" and that his membership
in the Communist Party and the related arrests did "not justify an
inference that he presently has bad moral character."24 In particular,
19. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 378 (1866) (holding that the practice of law may be made contingent upon "fair pri-
vate character"); Michael K. McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral Char-
acter Requirement for Bar Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67 (1984) [hereinafter
Structural Analysis].
20. Schware, 353 U.S. at 239.
21. See, e.g., In Re Cassidy, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202, 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944) (holding that
"[m]embership in the Bar is not a right; it is a privilege."). Cf In re Summers, 325 U.S.
561, 568 (1945). In Summers, the petitioner, a conscientious objector, was denied admis-
sion to the bar because he refused to swear allegiance to the state constitution and its re-
quirement that state citizens be willing to serve in the militia. The petitioner claimed
that he was denied admission in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. The State, however, ar-
gued that there was no case or controversy for the Court to review because the peti-
tioner's application for admission to the bar was merely a petition for a ministerial ap-
pointment as an officer of the state court. Id. at 365. The Court rejected this argument,
stating that petitioner could claim a "right to admission." Id. at 568. The Court ultimately
held that the State's denial did not violate the "principles of religious freedom which the
Fourteenth Amendment secures against state action." Id. at 573. See also Ex Parte Gar-
land, 71 U.S. at 379 (1866) (in which the Supreme Court stated that an attorney does not
hold "office" merely "as a matter of grace or favor").
22. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S: 36, 41 (1961); Matter of Brennan, 243
N.Y.S. 705 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930); In re Bean, 766 P.2d 955, 956 (Okla. 1988) (board of law
examiners must rebut applicant's initial showing of good character by presenting af-
firmative evidence of bad moral character); Structural Analysis, supra, at 17.
23. Schware, 353 U.S. at 239 n.5.
24. Id. at 246. Interestingly, the Court was unclear about whether an applicant's ar-
rest, without conviction, was a proper consideration in determining the applicant's good
character. The Court stated that "[tihe mere fact that a man has been arrested has very
little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct," and also
noted that an arrest is not competent evidence at either criminal or civil trials. Id. at 241.
At the same time, the Court considered the facts underlying the petitioner's arrests in de-
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the Court noted that there are many reasons why a person might
join the Communist Party (including youth and poverty, as in
Schware's case) which "are not indicative of bad moral character."2 5
Accordingly, Schware's application was remanded for proceedings
not inconsistent with the Court's opinion.
Subsequent to Schware, the Court held that the right to prac-
tice a chosen profession falls squarely within the liberty and prop-
erty interests protected by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment and applicable to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment.2' And, when the Court decided Baird in 1971, it ex-
pressly held that the right to practice law in particular is a protected
interest.27 Indeed, in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, the
Court characterized the practice of law as a "fundamental right" of
those qualified by training and character." Schware, then, was no-
table for recognizing that bar applicants have a constitutionally
protected interest in admission, and that the state's admission
power must be exercised consistent with constitutional guarantees.
The second due process case, Konigsberg v. State Bar,29 was
factually different from Schware. Unlike Schware, Konigsberg's
application was rejected after he refused to answer any questions
about his political affiliations, beliefs, and membership in the Com-
munist Party based on his rights guaranteed by the First and Four-
tail, and concluded that the facts in these arrests were insufficient to support a finding of
bad moral character. Id. at 243.
The Court's review of the facts underlying the petitioner's arrest certainly suggests
that a state can consider an applicant's arrest record, and even use it as a basis of denial
if the arrests were for sufficiently egregious offenses. It is difficult, however, to see how a
mere arrest can ever properly bear upon an applicant's fitness to practice law. After all,
attorneys, once admitted to the bar, are uniformly subject to disbarment only if they are
convicted of a crime and it is a crime of "moral turpitude." See, e.g., New York State Bar
Association, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-102 (1980).
25. Schware, 353 U.S. at 245 n.17. To demonstrate his virtue despite the taint of
Communism, Schware even went so far as to inform the bar examiners that "he regularly
read the bible to an illiterate soldier while in the Army and law to a blind [fellow] stu-
dent." Id. at 240.
26. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1958) ("freedom to practice [a] chosen pro-
fession" and "the right to... follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable govern-
ment interference are liberty and property 'concepts' protected by the Fifth Amendment").
27. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 424 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) ("The practice of law is not a
matter of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his learning and his moral charac-
ter.")
28. 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1984). See also Matter of Mitchell, 351 N.E.2d 743 (N.Y. 1976)
(recognizing that the practice of law is an interest protected by due process); Keller v.
State Bar of California, 226 Cal Rptr. 448, 460 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1986) (the view that
admission to the bar is a privilege "has now been thoroughly discredited"), rev'd on other
grounds, 767 P.2d 1020 (Cal. 1989).
29. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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teenth Amendments.30 The California Committee of Bar Examiners
claimed that it did not deny Konigsberg admission merely because
he refused to answer its questions, but because the refusal "tends to
support an inference that he is a member of the Communist Party
and therefore a person of bad moral character."3'
In its decision, the Court avoided the question of whether the
petitioner had a First Amendment right to refuse to answer
"inquiries about political associations and his opinions about mat-
ters of public interest."32 Instead, the Court ruled on whether, as a
matter of due process and equal protection, there was sufficient evi-
dence in the record to support the state's inference that Konigsberg
was a person of poor moral character. Finding that there was not,
the Court held that the committee's denial was "arbitrary and dis-
criminatory."33
In short, the Court did not hold in either Schware or Konigs-
berg that the questions asked by the bar examiners were impermis-
sible inquiries.34 Strictly speaking, the Court only held that the pe-
30. Id. at 258.
31. Id. at 270. The state also based its denial on testimony from an ex-Communist
that Konigsberg had attended Party meetings, and on editorials Konigsberg wrote for a
local newspaper criticizing the Korean War. The Supreme Court found all of these
grounds insufficient to justify the denial. Id. at 266-269.
32. Id. at 261. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that there was some support
in earlier decisions for Konigsberg's First Amendment claims, id. at 270, and that states
must not exercise their power over the bar "in such a way as to impinge on the freedom of
political expression or association." Id. at 273.
33. Id. at 262. See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (discussing arbitrary state action and due
process).
34. Prior to Schware and Konigsberg, however, the Court had held that a state could
not, consistent with due process, ask an individual about anything less than "knowing
activity" in a subversive organization, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952). In
Wieman, the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma loyalty oath statute which re-
quired all state employees to swear, among other things, that they were not affiliated
with any organization that advocated the overthrow of state or local government by force
or unlawful means, or any "party" or "group" which was on the United States Attorney
General's list of subversive organizations. Id. at 184 n.1. The Court considered whether "a
state, in attempting to bar disloyal individuals from its employ, [can] exclude persons
solely on the basis of organizational membership, regardless of their knowledge concern-
ing the organizations to which they had belonged." Id. at 190. After all, as the Court
noted, mere membership may be ignorant or innocent, or have occurred sometime before
or after an organization was corrupted by subversive influences. Id. The Court ruled that
"[i]ndiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion
of arbitrary power." Id. at 191. See also Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716
(1951) (affirming city's requirement that employees disclose membership in communist
organizations); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (allowing state to re-
quire that political candidates affirm their lack of subversive intent); Adler v. Board of
Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (addressing loyalty oaths and knowing membership in
subversive organizations).
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titioners had been improperly denied admission because the states'
reasons for denial did not demonstrate that the applicants were
unfit to practice law. Nevertheless, the decisions in Schware and
Konigsberg established certain constitutional principles for bar ad-
mission proceedings that, as discussed below, still apply to New
York's Question 21. First, a state does not have limitless authority
to deny admission based on its view that the candidate is morally
unfit. The state's authority is limited by an applicant's right to
practice law, assuming he or she is qualified by training and offers
credible proof of good character. Second, an applicant for admission
to the bar retains general constitutional rights, such as the right to
due process, which also limit the state's action. In particular, the
basis on which an applicant is denied admission must bear a ra-
tional relation to the state's interest in regulating admission.
The Supreme Court soon reached the First Amendment issues
raised by bar admission questions concerning political advocacy and
associations. At first, a few years after the decision in Konigsberg in
a case involving the same petitioner, the Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment did not prohibit a state from asking an appli-
cant about political beliefs or associations, or from denying an appli-
cant admission for refusing to answer such questions. Then, in 1971,
the Court reversed itself, and in deciding Baird, Stolar, and Wad-
mond, narrowed the scope of permissible state inquiries and upheld
the right of an applicant to refuse to answer broadly-worded inquir-
ies about membership or advocacy.
II. BAR ADMISSION DECISIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
After his case was remanded by the Supreme Court, Konigs-
berg was again asked by the California Bar Committee about his
political beliefs and affiliations. Konigsberg willingly told the
committee "unequivocally" that he did not believe in "violent over-
throw," and that "he had never knowingly been a member of an or-
ganization which advocated such action."35 He still, however, refused
to answer questions about past or present membership in the Com-
munist Party. 6 As a result the bar committee again denied his ap-
plication, this time relying "on the ground that his refusal to answer
35. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 39 (1961) (Konigsberg 1).
36. Id. at 38. The opinion does not quote the questions asked by the committee, but
they were evidently directed to past or present membership without qualification. The
opinion notes that Konigsberg argued to the Court that the committee's questions were
irrelevant because "bare, innocent membership" is not a basis for denial, and he had an-
swered the "ultimate" question of whether he had "knowingly belonged to an organization
advocating violent government overthrow." Id. at 46.
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had obstructed a full investigation into his qualifications."31 On ap-
peal, Konigsberg claimed not only that the committee's denial vio-
lated due process, but also that he had a First Amendment right to
refuse to answer the committee's questions. 8
The Court first rejected the due process claim, concluding that
"the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against arbitrary state ac-
tion does not forbid a State from denying admission to a bar appli-
cant so long as he refuses to provide unprivileged answers to ques-
tions having a substantial relevance to his qualifications."39 The
Court explained that the questions had relevance because even if
the committee could not infer that Konigsberg was a member of the
Communist Party or had poor character from his refusal to answer
questions about Party membership, the questions were a proper
"preliminary" to determining whether, if he had been a Communist,
he had advocated unlawful or violent acts.40 By refusing to answer
the committee's questions Konigsberg prevented the committee from
completing its investigation and reaching an informed decision
about his character and fitness. Since Konigsberg bore the initial
burden of establishing his right to admission, and the committee
was not required to ignore potentially relevant avenues of inquiry,
the committee was entitled to refuse admission based on Konigs-
berg's failure to cooperate with the admission authorities.
The Court then considered Konigsberg's claim that questions
about his membership in the Communist Party impinged upon his
rights to free speech and association guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.41 In doing so, the Court weighed the gov-
ernment's interest in regulating the practice of law against the peti-
tioner's First Amendment rights. On one side of the scale the Court
37. Id.
38. Konigsberg also claimed that the committee's decision was inconsistent with the
Court's decision in his first appeal. The Court disagreed:
The Court did not consider [in the first case] ... all questions as to the permissi-
bility of the State treating Konigsberg's refusal to answer as a ground for ex-
clusion, not because it was evidence from which substantive conclusions might
be drawn, but because the refusal had thwarted a full investigation into his
qualifications.
Id. at 43.
39. Id. at 44.
40. Id. at 46-47. Konigsberg argued that the committee's questions about Commu-
nist affiliations were irrelevant because "bare, innocent membership" in the Communist
Party is not a ground for denial and he had answered "such ultimate questions as
whether he himself believed in violent overthrow or knowingly belonged to an organiza-
tion advocating violent overthrow." Id. at 46. The Court rejected this argument because
the committee was not required to accept Konigsberg's answers at face value, and could
properly ask about his knowledge of the aims and functions of the Communist Party and
his activities. Id. at 46-47.
41. Id. at 49.
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placed a state's need to discover those "applicants for membership in
a profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of this
country's legal and political institutions" who may be willing to use
illegal means to change those institutions.42 On the other side, the
Court placed what it simply termed the "minimal effect" on First
Amendment rights occasioned by disclosure of political beliefs and
associations.43 Cast in these terms, the Court's finding in favor of the
State was not hard to predict.'
In deciding in favor of the state, the Court concluded that the
questions directed at Konigsberg were proper because their purpose
42. Id. at 52.
43. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that "it has already been held
that the interest in not subjecting speech and association to the deterrence of subsequent
disclosure is outweighed by the State's interest in ascertaining the fitness of the employ-
ees for the post he holds. . . "Id. at 52 (citing Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357
U.S. 399 (1957)). In Beilan, the petitioner was a public school teacher who refused to an-
swer questions about Communist Party membership, and was discharged for
"incompetency" based on this refusal, not because of his activities or associations. Id. at
405-06. On appeal, the petitioner never claimed that he had a First Amendment right to
refuse to answer. Instead, he claimed that the incompetency finding violated due process
and that, also as a matter of due process, he should have been warned of the conse-
quences of refusing to answer. Id. at 404, 408. Consequently, while Beilan may have been
relevant to the due process issues in Konigsberg II, it had nothing to do with the Court's
conclusion that Konigsberg's First Amendment interests were minimal.
In finding that disclosure had "minimal effect," the Court also relied on Garner v.
Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1950). Garner was closer to the point, but nevertheless
missed it. See Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 52. In Garner, various City employees were dis-
charged for refusing to take an oath or file an affidavit stating, among other things, that
they did not advocate government overthrow and had never been affiliated with a group
that did. Garner, 341 U.S. at 718-19. The Court upheld the city's action after ruling that
its loyalty requirements did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 720-21. However, in
doing so, the Court read a scienter element into the oath and affidavit, and assumed that
they pertained only to knowing membership in subversive groups. Id. at 723-24. As a re-
sult, Garner was part of a series of cases first holding that the government could only
seek information about knowing membership, and ultimately limiting the scope of gov-
ernmental inquiries to those directed at "specific intent." See infra part III. Apparently,
the questions Konigsberg was asked were not similarly circumscribed.
44. See Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 62-71 (Black, J. dissenting). In his dissent, Justice
Black attacked the majority's balancing test by arguing that the First Amendment's
guarantees are absolute, especially where, as here, the State's questions about Commu-
nist affiliations did not have a merely incidental effect on speech but in fact targeted
speech and association for the "avowed purpose" of penalizing unpopular views. Id. at 70.
Justice Black further argued that even if the government has the right to regulate speech
under some circumstances, the recognized constitutional standard for determining the
need for regulation is the clear and present danger test. A clear and present danger
arises, however, only when the danger is so severe and imminent that there is "no time
for rational discussion." Id. at 63. See also text accompanying notes 77-78. While the ma-
jority made passing reference to clear and present danger, see Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at
50, it did not claim that the case involved an imminent danger to state interests, and
went on to apply a balancing test instead without fully discussing the authority or rea-
sons for doing so.
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was "to deny positions [of public trust] to persons supposed to be
dangerous," not to "penalize political beliefs."45 This distinction,
however, misapprehends the First Amendment issue in the case.
Certainly, a state has the right to deny bar admission based on an
applicant's illegal act or even illegal intent. But the critical First
Amendment question in Konigsberg II is whether the state's means
of investigating possible bases for denial were constitutional. Even
assuming that the questions served legitimate purposes, the scope
and wording of the questions required independent scrutiny to de-
termine whether they were sufficiently tailored to serve those pur-
poses without unduly trenching on First Amendment rights.46 In
Konigsberg II, however, once the Court found that the purpose of the
State's questions was proper, it said nothing at all about the lan-
guage and scope of the questions themselves apart from its con-
clusory assertion that they were minimally intrusive.47
Eleven years later, in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, the Su-
preme Court all but expressly overruled Konigsberg II. Although the
Court did little in the way of analyzing the content of the questions
about loyalty and advocacy at issue in the case, its decision in Baird
demonstrated that the Court would no longer endorse a state's in-
45. Id. at 54. See also Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 421 P.2d 76, 87
(Cal. 1966) ("The purposes of investigation by the bar into an applicant's moral character
should be limited to assurance that, if admitted, he will not obstruct the administration of
justice or otherwise act unscrupulously in his capacity as an officer of the court.").
46. See generally Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Shelton, the Court
struck down an Arkansas statute requiring teachers annually to file a list of their organ-
izational affiliations. In its analysis, the Court explained the requisite constitutional fit
between state means and ends as follows:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted). See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hampstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594-95 (1962) (when states exercise their powers to protect the public welfare, safety, or
morals, the means used must be "reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311 (1939) (statutes impinging on fundamental rights must be "narrowly drawn to
define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a sub-
stantial interest of the State"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMiERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
709-13 (1978) [hereinafter TRIBE] (discussing generally overbreadth and "least restrictive
alternatives").
47. See also In re Anastapalo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). In Anastapalo, the Supreme Court
held that an applicant's due process rights were not violated when he was denied admis-
sion to the bar for refusal to answer bar committee inquiries about advocacy of govern-
ment overthrow on First Amendment grounds. The Court premised its decision on the
now rejected views that admission to the bar was a "privilege," rather than a right, sus-
ceptible to comprehensive state regulation, and the inquiries at issue did not overly bur-
den First Amendment rights. See id. at 89-90.
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vestigation at the expense of rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment. In Baird, the petitioner had passed the Arizona Bar
Examination. As part of the examination, she was asked questions
pertaining to her character and fitness. Baird answered all the
questions except one which asked her to state whether she had ever
been a member of the Communist Party or any organization "that
advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or
violence.""8 Based on Baird's refusal to answer that question, the bar
examiners declined to process her application.49 Baird appealed theexaminers' decision to the Supreme Court on the ground that it vio-
lated the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association.
In its decision, the Court first summarized its previous bar
admission cases, and found them to be characterized by "[s]harp
conflicts and close divisions" that frequently yielded puzzling re-
sul;s.50 Then the Court reaffirmed that states have a "legitimate in-
terest in determining whether [an applicant] has the qualities of
character and professional competence requisite to the practice of
law."5' In contrast to the overwhelming weight the Court attributed
to this interest in Konigsberg II, however, in Baird the Court as-
serted that the state bears a "heavy burden" when it "seeks to in-
quire about an individual's beliefs and associations."" In the Court's
view, "[t]he practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of right for
one who is qualified by his learning and his moral character,"53 and
"whatever justification may be offered, a State may not inquire
about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of with-
holding a right or benefit because of what he believes."' Thus, the
Court broadly held that an applicant's exercise of First Amendment
rights is "immune" from bar admission "inquisitions."55
Taken literally, the state's burden would be an impossible one
if applicants enjoy such immunity. In fact, as the later Wadmond
decision shows, the state can make circumscribed inquiries about an
applicant's views and associations.56 Nevertheless, while never ex-
pressly overruling Konigsberg II,57 or even stating that Arizona's
48. Baird, 401 U.S. at 4-5 (1970) (quoting question no. 27 of the Arizona Bar
Examination).
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 2, 4.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at6.
53. Id. at 8. Cf Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957)
(declining to decide whether the practice of law is a right or privilege).
54. Baird, 401 U.S. at 7.
55. Id. at 8.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 66-70.
57. After criticizing Konigsberg H and other cases for their "puzzling holdings," the
Court simply stated that the "best way" to decide Baird's case was "to narrate its simple
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question was unconstitutional, the Court evidently sought to redress
the balance struck in that case between the State's interests and the
First Amendment. Hence, while the decision made plain the Court's
view that Arizona's inquiries about the petitioner's associations
were constitutionally impermissible, it left open the question of
where a new balance would be found.
58
The Court reached a similar result in the companion case of In
re Stolar. The petitioner in Stolar was denied admission to the Ohio
Bar for refusing to answer an application question which asked
"whether you have been, or presently are... a member of any or-
ganization which advocates the overthrow of the government of the
United States by force." 9 The Ohio Bar Committee contended that
its question served "a legitimate interest because it needs to know
whether an applicant has belonged to an organization which has
'espoused illegal aims' and whether the applicant himself has es-
poused such aims."60 The Supreme Court, however, ruled that "the
First Amendment prohibits Ohio from penalizing an applicant by
denying him admission to the Bar solely because of his membership
in an organization" or "because he personally... 'espouses illegal
aims'."61 Moreover, since the State could not deny admission because
of membership, the question about membership served no purpose
for the admission proceedings. Thus, the Court concluded that the
question itself violated the First Amendment because "no legitimate
state interest... is served by a question which sweeps so broadly
into areas of belief and association protected against government in-
vasion."5 2
The statement in Stolar that "espousal of illegal aims" is not a
constitutional basis for denial is very broad, and again, if taken lit-
erally, the Court's language would seemingly preclude any state in-
vestigation of political beliefs or associations. When read in-the
proper context, however, the Court's statement is unsurprising. In
rejecting espousal of illegal aims as a basis for denial, the Court
facts and then relate them to the 45 words that make up the First Amendment." Baird,
401 U.S. at 4.
58. Id. Interestingly, while holding that the question as to whether the petitioner
had belonged to the Communist Party violated the First Amendment, the Court was ap-
parently unconcerned about the constitutionality of another question which required that
an applicant list the organizations to which she had belonged since the age of sixteen. See
id. at n.7. For First Amendment purposes, such an inquiry seems little different from a
question specifically directed to affiliation with the Communist Party, since the amend-
ment protects freedom of association in general.
59. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. at 27.
60. Id. at 28.
61. Id. at 28-29.
62. Id. at 30.
1994]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cited its earlier decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut.63 There, in
striking down a statute which forbade solicitation for religious
causes without a license, the Court stated that the First Amendment
"embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.""
Consistent with this distinction, in Stolar the Court, by stating that
mere espousal of an illegal aim is not a proper basis for denial, was
simply reaffirming the traditional broad line between impermissible
state sanction of political opinion or speech and permissible regula-
tion of action designed to implement the views espoused. Since a
person's illegal conduct poses a concrete threat to society, a state's
denial of admission based on conduct may be justified by its interest
in protecting society.65
Ultimately, the Court held in Law Students Research Council v.
Wadmond66 that a state could deny admission to the bar if an appli-
cant's advocacy of government overthrow, or membership in a group
advocating overthrow, was coupled with the specific intent to
achieve that end. In Wadmond, various individuals and student or-
ganizations challenged an earlier version of the New York State bar
application, in which the text of the existing Question 21 was desig-
nated Question 26(a) and was followed by subparagraph (b), which
stated:
[If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative,] did you during the period of
such membership or association, have the specific intent to further the
aims of such organization or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the
government of the United States or any state or any political subdivision
thereof by force, violence or any unlawful means?
67
The Court held that this question, taken as a whole, could be asked
because it has long been recognized "that knowing membership in
an organization advocating the overthrow of the Government by
force or violence, on the part of one sharing the specific intent to
further the organization's illegal goals, may be made criminally
punishable.6 8 Since subparagraph (b) of the question expressly fo-
63. 310 U.S. 296 (1939).
64. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
65. Id..at 304.
66. 401 U.S. 154 (1976).
67. Id. at 175. None of the petitioners in Wadmond had been denied admission. In-
stead, their challenge was based on the claim that Question 26 chilled the exercise of pro-
tected constitutional rights by New York law students. Id. at 158-59.
68. Id at 165. (citation omitted). Wadmond presented an issue that Justice Stewart
anticipated in his concurrence in Baird, 401 U.S. at 9 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting
that the "mere membership" penalized by the Arizona inquiry 'can be quite different from
knowing membership in an organization advocating the overthrow of the Government by
force or violence, on the part of one sharing the specific intent to further the organiza-
[Vol. 42
RELIC OF MCCARTHYISM
cused on specific intent, New York could ask in subparagraph (a)
about "Communist affiliations as a preliminary to further inquiry
about the nature of the association and may exclude an applicant for
refusal to answer."69
Although the majority did not further elaborate on its reasons
for approving the question challenged in Wadmond, in contrast to
the questions found improper in Baird and Stolar, the decision was
evidently premised on the Court's view that an applicant who had
the specific intent to bring about government overthrow had crossed
into the realm of action, and was no longer immune from state in-
quiries and sanctions.70 Further, the question in Wadmond did not
ask about mere, unqualified membership in an organization, as did
the more "sweeping" questions at issue in Baird and Stolar. Rather,
the question expressly asked whether the applicant was a "knowing
member" in a group advocating unlawful action, and whether he or
she "specifically intended" unlawful action while a member. Accord-
ing to the Court, the question was therefore precisely tailored to a
legitimate area of inquiry.'
The question remains, however, whether an inquiry like New
York's Question 21 targeting knowing membership alone, without
reference to the applicant's specific intent, is sufficiently tailored to
pass muster under the First Amendment. Earlier Supreme Court
case law makes plain that the answer to this question is no: without
expressly focusing on the applicant's specific intent while a member
of an organization, "knowing" or otherwise, any question about an
applicant's associations will violate the First Amendment.
Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORT OF "SPECIFIC INTENT"
The import of the "specific intent" language which allowed the
question in Wadmond to pass constitutional muster may first seem
elusive. In fact, specific intent is a critical component of the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence and places important limits
on a state's ability to test a person's loyalty or scrutinize his or her
past associations. Following the Second World War, the Court de-
tion's illegal goals").
69. Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 165-66.
70. Id. at 165. See also id. at 181-82 (Black, J., dissenting). The majority's con-
clusion that these questions do not violate the First Amendment seems to be
based on the assumption that the state may punish a man for knowing mem-
bership in an organization which advocates violent overthrow of the Govern-
ment if he specifically intends to bring about such overthrow. On this assump-
tion, the majority appears to conclude that since such conduct is criminally
punishable, the state may inquire about it in order to exclude an individual who
has been a member of one of these organizations with the requisite intent.
71. Id. at 165.
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cided a series of cases involving inquisitions about political loyalties
and government overthrow.72 The central issue in each case was the
same, "whether involving lawyers, doctors, marine workers, or State
and Federal Government employees, namely: to what extent does
the [constitution] protect persons against governmental intrusion
and invasion into private beliefs and views that have not ripened
into any punishable conduct?"73
In the first of these cases, arising from federal prosecutions un-
der the Smith Act,74 the Supreme Court held that the First Amend-
ment requires more than mere "knowing membership" in a subver-
sive or illegal organization before an individual can be punished for
affiliation with such an organization. In Dennis v. United States,"
the Court found that the "structure and purpose" of the Smith Act,
which punished "knowing[] or willful[]" advocacy of government
overthrow, required "the inclusion of intent as an element of the
crime."76 Although the Act said nothing at all about proof of intent,
the Court read that element into the statute and then found the Act
constitutional. In narrowing and upholding the Smith Act in this
manner, the Court relied on the "clear and present danger" doctrine
first articulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States" and
later in Gitlow v. New York.7" Recognizing that government has a
72. Many of the Supreme Court's loyalty oath cases also discuss the Fifth
Amendment implications of requiring an applicant to divulge association with a subver-
sive organization. See generally Structural Analysis supra note 3, at 82; TRIBE, supra note
46 at 708 (summarizing the Supreme Court's "confused" precedents dealing with loyalty
tests and the fifth amendment). Since criminal prosecution for political affiliations is now
extremely unlikely, the possible Fifth Amendment issues arising from Question 21 have
little practical significance and will not be discussed.
73. Stolar, 401 U.S. at 24-25.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1993). Among other things, the Smith Act makes it unlawful
for any person to "knowingly or willfully" advocate overthrowing or destroying any gov-
ernment in the United States by "force or violence," or to organize or to help to organize
any "society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the over-
throw" of national or local government "by force or violence."
75. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
76. Id. at 499.
77. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Schenck involved the conviction of a Socialist for printing
and distributing a document allegedly calculated to incite insubordination in the military.
Holmes, writing for the Court and affirming the convictions, stated that "the question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 52.
78. 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, Dennis is notable
for being one of the first instances in which the Court applied the clear and present dan-
ger standard, at least in name. Notably, while Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the major-
ity in Dennis, invoked this standard and narrowed the Smith Act, the Court nevertheless
deferred to "wholesale legislative determinations" about the dangers of subversive influ-
ences and upheld the basic constitutionality of the Act. TRIBE, supra note 45, at 613-14;
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legitimate interest in protecting itself "from change by violence,
revolution and terrorism," 9 the Court found that advocacy of gov-
ernment overthrow presents a clear and present danger to the state,
and that the state may therefore proscribe or penalize membership
in groups advocating overthrow.80 However, in reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court assumed that advocacy meant speech coupled with
an intent to carry out violent or unlawful actions, and that it was
the intent and not the speech which was targeted by the Smith Act.
81
Thus, the Court concluded that while the First Amendment protects
political speech and freedom of association, the government could
"indicate to those who would advocate constitutionally prohibited
conduct that there is a line beyond which they may not go."82
In Scales v. United States," the Supreme Court affirmed a
conviction under the Smith Act for "the acquisition or holding of
knowing membership in any organization' which advocates the
overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or vio-
lence."" In doing so, however, the Court limited prosecution under
the Act to "'active' members having also a guilty knowledge and in-
tent." 5 The Court reasoned that even if a person joins a group advo-
cating impermissible ends with knowledge of the ends advocated, he
or she may join in support of other legitimate purposes embraced by
the group, or in the belief that he or she can influence the group to
pursue lawful aims.8" Indeed, a person may even approve of the ille-
gal aims of the group, but personally do nothing to advance those
aims.87 As a result, unless there is proof of a "specific intent" to ac-
complish something unlawful, even an "active" member who knows
of the group's illegal ends cannot be prosecuted. 8
see generally SWINDLER, supra note 2, at 245-46 (analyzing the Court's use of the 'clear
and present danger" rationale in Dennis.).
79. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 501.
80. Id. at 515. See also Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669 (stating that government interest in
regulating speech is limited to incitement presenting "a sufficient danger of substantive
evil").
81. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 502.
82. Id. at 516. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what
may be made impermissible and subject to regulation is-the line between ideas and overt
acts."); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298- (1956) (holding that in addition to knowing
membership in a group advocating forcible overthrow of the government, the advocacy at
issue must be of immediate action, not abstract doctrine or action at some future time).
83. 367 U.S. 203 (1960).
84. Id. at 205.
85. Id. at 228-30. See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1962) (distinguishing
.active" from mere knowing membership).
86. Scales, 367 U.S. at 228-30.
87. Id. at 228.88. Id. at 229. See also Note v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) (Smith Act
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The reasoning articulated in Dennis, Scales, and their progeny
readily encompassed and was applied to cases involving other pen-
alties imposed by the federal and state governments for membership
in the Communist Party or advocacy of government overthrow. For
example, in Elffbrandt v. Russell 9 the Supreme Court struck down
an Arizona law mandating discharge of state employees who
"knowingly and willfully" joined the Communist Party or any group
which advocated government overthrow.0 The Court noted that
"[those who join an organization but do not share its unlawful pur-
pose and who do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose
no threat, either as citizens or as public employees."9' Accordingly,
absent a specific intent to commit unlawful acts, the State was not
faced with conduct "'constituting a clear and present danger to a
substantial interest of the State.'" 92 The Arizona statute, by penaliz-
ing mere "knowing" membership in the Communist party or other
organizations, threatened "the cherished freedom of association
protected by the First Amendment." 93
Similarly, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents94 the Court struck
down a regulation of the State University of New York barring em-
ployment of teachers who were members of the Communist Party
and other listed organizations. 9 The Court held that "[miere know-
ing membership without a specific intent to further the unlawful
aims of an organization is not a constitutionally adequate basis" for
excluding teachers from a professional position they were otherwise
qualified to hold.96
It is in this widening circle of constitutional protection, cen-
tered on the Supreme Court's specific intent requirement, that the
bar admission cases ultimately assume their place. The question in
Wadmond, as noted, included both "knowing membership" and
"specific intent" elements which were not in the questions at issue in
Baird and Stolar. But it is specific intent alone which renders the
question sufficiently tailored to pass muster under the Supreme
prosecutions require "rigorous standards of proof" of "present" advocacy of government
overthrow.).
89. 384 U.S. 11 (1965).
90. Id. at 13.
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id. at 18 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1939)).
93. Elfbrandt, 384 U.S. at 18. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1963) (holding that denying passports to members of the Communist Party violated both
Fifth and First Amendment rights).
94. 385 U.S. 589 (1966).
95. Id. at 606.
96. Id. See also Federation of Federal Employees v. Greenberg, 789 F. Supp. 430
(D.D.C. 1992) (holding that Pentagon security clearance questionnaire which inquired
about past associations violated the First Amendment.).
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Court's decisions limiting intrusions upon freedom of speech and as-
sociation. Of course, reasonable minds may differ as to whether the
question approved in Wadmond was so precisely tailored. Consider
the situation of an applicant who was a knowing member in a sub-
versive group, but did not harbor a specific intent to overthrow the
government. Even though the applicant answers "no" to part (b) of
the Wadmond question, he or she must still answer "yes" to part (a).
Presumably, the state need not accept the applicant's responses at
face value (after all, part (a) is a "preliminary" inquiry),97 and may
demand additional information about the applicant's membership to
gauge the nature of his or her involvement. This demand might not
only include the name of the organization, but also the identity of
other members who might have information about the organization
or the applicant. Thus, Wadmond does little to narrow the potential
scope of a state's inquiries, since applicants may still be required to
divulge constitutionally protected activities and explain those ac-
tivities to state officials. Indeed, given that the Supreme Court has
held that membership lists may be protected by the First Amend-
ment,98 the Court's approval of the question in Wadmond invites
additional conflicts over the permissible scope of bar admission in-
quiries.
Nevertheless, by relying on the specific intent element to up-
hold the question in Wadmond, the Supreme Court grounded bar
admission proceedings on fundamental principles of First Amend-
ment law. First, a state may investigate, restrict or penalize advo-
cacy or association with a political group only when the advocacy or
association poses a danger to legitimate state interests. Second,
there is insufficient danger to state interests to warrant regulation
or penalties unless an individual had the specific intent of acting, or
making others act, violently or illegally. Finally, any regulation of
speech or association which is not narrowly tailored to the investi-
gation or punishment of a person's specific unlawful intent is over-
broad and impermissably trenches on freedom of speech.
Certainly, the potential danger to state interests at issue in bar
admission proceedings hardly amounts to the type of imminent cri-
sis which justifies regulation under the clear and present danger
test. And the Court has never articulated a consistent, alternative
reading of the First Amendment which would accommodate state
97. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1961); text accompanying note
40.
98. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("[C]ompelled disclosure of affili-
ation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute... a restraint on freedom of asso-
ciation," since "[inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances




regulation or sanction of political speech and association based on a
lesser or less immediate danger. Specific intent, however, at least
requires the state to demonstrate and define a tangible threat to its
interests that justifies regulation of speech and association. As a re-
sult, the Wadmond decision has one very important practical ef-
fect-it requires that the state justify its questions and, if an appli-
cant is denied admission, its reason for denial. Instead of unre-
strained investigation into an applicant's political opinions and as-
sociations, the state's questions must be expressly directed to the
applicant's specific intent. While specific intent is not itself well-de-
fined, its resonance with the mental state underlying most crimi-
nally culpable acts and the requirement that the state provide suf-
ficient evidence to support a denial of admission significantly cur-
tails the state's ability to base denial on arbitrary or discriminatory
motives. In short, specific intent provides at least some assurance
that the state cannot place official political preferences before an
applicant's First Amendment rights or right to practice a chosen
profession.
Thus, in Wadmond, the First Amendment and due process is-
sues underlying bar admission proceedings merged. Due process
mandates that the state can deny admission only if the basis of de-
nial has a rational relation to a legitimate state interest.99 Arguably,
an applicant's affiliation with an organization advocating violent or
illegal government overthrow is a relevant, rational consideration in
determining the applicant's good character and willingness to sup-
port the constitution, even if the manner in which the question is
asked violates the First Amendment. But once the Supreme Court
incorporated specific intent into the First Amendment jurisprudence
of bar admissions, a state's legitimate interest was limited, as a
matter of due process, to whether an applicant's intent justified de-
nial. Any inquiry not tailored to determining whether the applicant
had that intent, even if it has some potential relevance to the appli-
cant's character, is not related to a legitimate subject of state in-
quiry and violates both the First Amendment and due process."'
Question 21 of the New York bar admission application is such
an unconstitutional inquiry. The question asks only whether the
applicant has "ever organized or helped to organize or become a
99. See part I, supra.
100. Although the decision was not premised on due process, the Court noted in Sto-
lar that "no legitimate state interest... is served by a question which sweeps so broadly
into areas of belief and association protected against government invasion." In re Stolar,
402 U.S. 23, 30 (1971). Similarly, in upholding the question in Wadmond, the Court relied
on the fact that the specific intent to overthrow the government by force or violence may
be criminally punishable and a proper subject of state investigation. Law Students Civil
Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 165 (1971).
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member of any organization" which he or she knew was advocating
or teaching unlawful or violent action against the Government. No-
where in Question 21, or anywhere else in the application, is there
any inquiry about whether the applicant had the specific intent of
advancing those unlawful or violent acts. This shortcoming is fatal.
Even if the Appellate Division or the Committees on Character do
not actually discriminate between applicants based on their re-
sponses to the question, the potential for such discrimination is suf-
ficient to render the question unconstitutional. Questions like
Question 21 are "easily adapted to fit personal views and predilec-
tions," and remain "dangerous instrument[s] for arbitrary and disc-
riminatory denial of the right to practice law."1 1
With this potential, Question 21 hangs like the "sword of Da-
modes" over the heads of future New York lawyers, and the possi-
bility of non-admission to the bar based on an unsatisfactory answer
to Question 21 may chill the free exercise of First Amendment rights
by aspiring attorneys.102 Given the tremendous investment of time,
money, and expectations which attend preparation for a legal career,
many students may choose not to express potentially controversial
opinions or join unpopular groups to avoid any possible impediment
to later admission to the bar. Admittedly, membership in the Com-
munist Party or other groups considered highly suspect a few dec-
ades ago may not carry the same taint it once did, and there have
been no recent reports of the Character Committees engaging in
"witch hunts" for subversive applicants. Nevertheless, the question
remains a ready tool for arbitrary or discriminatory denial of ad-
mission to the bar predicated on the political preferences of the state
officials who must approve an applicant's "good character."103 Even if
101. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957). See also Pushinsky v. West
Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 266 S.E.2d 444, 446 (W. Va. 1980) (striking down ques-
tion similar to Question 21 because no reference to applicants specific intent).
102. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (discussing chilling effect of
"compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy"); Cummings v.
Hampton, 485 F.2d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir. 1973) (discussing the chilling effect on physicians
of inquiries by veterans hospital about membership in organizations advocating unlawful
government overthrow not limited to the physicians' "specific intent"); Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977) (holding that First Amendment rights of attorneys were
"chill[edl" by "in terrorem" effect of statute regulating attorney advertising); Ozonoff v.
Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 1984) ("if the plaintiff's interest in getting or keeping
a job is real, the likely 'chilling effect' of an apparent speech-related job qualification con-
stitutes a real injury").
103. See Ralph S. Brown & John D. Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar,
20 U. Cm. L. REV. 480, 500-02 (1953) (discussing the risk and examples of "aimless[] hec-
toring" about political beliefs which may attend bar admission interviews). Aside from
prevailing public views about the legitimacy of a political position or organization, the in-
evitably imprecise nature of the "good character" and "fituess" requirements for admis-
sion to the bar readily allows the personal preferences of officials charged with regulating
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* Question 21 is not actively employed to enforce official views of po-
litical fitness for the practice of law, an applicant's mere expectation
of being called upon to list and account for "knowing membership" in
a group and the potential for denial because of membership goes a
long way toward ensuring political conformity. After all, "the value
of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs-not that it drops."
10 4
Of course, more than just the rights of bar applicants, or the
integrity of the bar admission process, may suffer because of Ques-
tion 21. If tolerance of state investigation of political views and po-
litical conformity among members of the bar makes it less likely that
lawyers will represent individuals or organizations that espouse un-
orthodox views, the legal profession cannot fulfill its public respon-
sibilities. Although those unorthodox segments of society may be
most in need of sympathetic legal counsel because of their differ-
ences, they may at the same time find it far more difficult to find
counsel.105 Ultimately, to the extent that each person's ability to
"think as you will and speak as you think are indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth," 1 6 society at large is ill-
served by New York's means of screening for subversive bar appli-
cants.
the admission process to intrude on admission determinations. See Pushinsky v. Board of
Law Examiners, 266 S.E.2d 444, 450 (W. Va. 1980) ("One cannot be held to have failed to
prove good moral character in the sense of being an honest and truthful person simply by
the fact that he clings to certain political philosophies with which the Board of Law Ex-
aminers and, perhaps, a majority of Americans disagree."); Deborah L Rhode, Moral
Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985); White, supra note 18
(discussing whether the good character requirement is unconstitutionally vague).
104. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. This point was perhaps best made by the petitioner in Baird, who wrote the
following in her brief for the Supreme Court about the Arizona counterpart to New York's
Question 21:
Question 27 does nothing to accomplish the objective of screening unethical
lawyers. It acts as an impediment to the unorthodox applicant and to the appli-
cant who believes that the question violates the Bill of Rights. As a result, the
public suffers. Lawyers have a duty to serve the entirety of the public regardless
of its individual political views and activities. The profession may be unable to
fulfill this duty if the establishment is entitled to weed out of the bar those who,
by virtue of their own outlooks, may view with sympathy the legal problems of
the anti-establishment minorities.
Brief for Petitioner at 36, Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 2 (1971). Certainly, New
York has a long tradition of respecting the right to express unorthodox views, and the
need for legal counsel to represent those who espouse such views. In 1920 Charles Evans
Hughes represented five Socialist Party members when the New York State Assembly
denied them their seats in the New York State Assembly, arguing that "it is the essence
of the instruments of liberty that it be recognized that guilt is personal and cannot be at-
tributed to the holding of opinion or to mere intent in the absence of overt acts .... " 5
NEwYoRKLEGis. DOC. No. 30, 143d SESS., p. 4 (1920).
106. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
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IV. QUESTTON 21 AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In light of Wadmond and the other cases I have discussed, the
Appellate Division, Second Department, erred in denying my appli-
cation for admission. The Court's view that the question is "proper"
simply ignores the controlling United States Supreme Court
authority."' The Appellate Division's other, related reason for de-
nial, that my refusal to answer the question was "willful obstruction
of the legitimate function of the Committees" to inquire into my
character,0 " was equally erroneous.
In Baird and Stolar, the Supreme Court held that states could
not deny admission to applicants who refused to answer questions
on legitimate First Amendment grounds. Indeed, in both cases, the
Court rejected the states' arguments that they had denied admission
to the petitioners because they had obstructed the admission proc-
ess. 0 9 More basically, it simply makes no sense to find that an appli-
cant's refusal to answer an impermissible question is cause for de-
nial. After all, one of the central purposes of the application and re-
view process for admission to the bar is to identify candidates who
are able and willing to uphold the federal and State constitutions.
Surely, an applicant's refusal to comply with a request that violates
constitutional law cannot reflect negatively on his or her legal abili-
ties or good character."0
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Appellate Division's
decision, however, is that it might have been avoided had the court
107. In re Fieman, No. 6193N (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
108. Id.
109. Although in the Baird opinion the Court did not directly address the question of
obstruction, Arizona largely relied on the second Konigsberg decision to argue that re-
gardless of the constitutional merits of the petitioner's arguments she had frustrated le-
gitimate ends of the bar screening committees. Brief for Respondent at 8, Baird, 401 U.S.
1. The Court, by its decision, implicitly rejected this argument. In Stolar, however, the
Court expressly stated that the petitioner had not "obstructed or frustrated" the bar ad-
mission process by not answering questions which violated the First Amendment, noting
that "he did answer all of the.., questions relevant to his fitness and competence to
practice law." In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971). See also Pushinsky v. West Virginia
Board of Law Examiners, 266 S.E.2d 444, 446 (W. Va. 1980) (holding that an applicant's
response of "decline to answer" to a question similar to Question 21 was 'one of three
possible answers," along with "yes" or "no," and cannot be characterized as a refusal to
answer or obstruction).
110. Oddly enough, before concluding that I was obstructionist, the Second Depart-
ment had rejected a proposal I submitted of answering the question approved in Wad-
mond, which incorporates Question 21 in paragraph (a) but also contains the requisite
"specific intent" language in paragraph (b). See Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1971). This response would have met
constitutional requirements while satisfying the Appellate Division's request for an an-
swer to the question on its application. The Appellate Division, however, declined to ac-
cept anything but a one word "yes" or "no" answer to Question 21 as written.
1994]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
not violated a fundamental guarantee of due process-the right to a
formal hearing prior to denial of admission to the bar. More than
twenty years ago, in a case arising from another bar admission de-
nial by the New York Appellate Division, the United States Supreme
Court held that due process is violated if a bar applicant is denied
admission without a hearing. In Willner v. Committee on Charac-
ter,' the petitioner's application for admission to the New York Bar
was denied when an attorney submitted a letter to the character
committees attacking the -petitioner's character."' On appeal, the
New York Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner's claim that the
lack of an opportunity to either confront his accuser or refute the
basis of denial violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Supreme Court overruled that decision, holding that "the require-
ments of procedural due process must be met before a State can ex-
clude a person from practicing law""' and that the "[pletitioner was
clearly entitled to notice of and a hearing on the grounds for his re-
jection either before the Committee or before the Appellate Divi-
""14sion.
The various laws and rules regulating New York State bar
admission procedures do not provide for a hearing before a denial of
admission." 5 At no time, formally or informally, was I afforded an
opportunity by the Appellate Division to present my reasons for not
answering Question 21, either in person or in a brief. Indeed, had it
not been for an informal communication from the Character Com-
mittees that a minority of its members had dissented from the
Committees' favorable admission recommendation because of my re-
fusal to answer Question 21, I would have had no idea that my re-
sponse to the question was still an issue after the recommendation
had been forwarded." 6 I was not allowed to see a copy of the Charac-
111. 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
112. Id. at 101.
113. Id. at 102.
114. Id. at 105. See also Economico v. Village of Pelham, 405 N.E.2d 694, 696 (N.Y.
1980) (the "essence" of due process is "fundamental fairness," and "[ilt demands that the
government treat all justly by granting to the individual against whom governmental de-
cisions operate the right to be heard."); In re Mitchell, 351 N.E. 2d 743, 745 (N.Y. 1976)
("the requirements of procedural due process must be met before a State can exclude a
person from practicing law." (quoting Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96,
102 (1963))).
115. See N.Y. JUD. LAW (McKinney 1992); N.Y. RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(McKinney 1993); N.Y. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND
DEPARTMENT (McKinney 1993).
116. I was also informally told that the minority dissent was not based on doubts
about my character stemming from that refusal, but on the view that the Committees
could not issue its recommendation until the Appellate Division had decided whether
Question 21 was proper and whether I was required to answer the question.
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ter Committees' decision, and had no word from the Appellate Divi-
sion that it was considering denial until the order of denial was for-
mally issued.11 7 Under these circumstances, it was simply impossible
for me fully to address the legal issues surrounding my response to
Question 21. Common sense suggests that it was equally impossible
for the Appellate Division fairly to determine whether my objections
were made in good faith, or were merely obstructionist.
With no opportunity to argue against denial of my application
before the Appellate Division issued its order, I decided to exercise
the only remaining procedural safeguard-review of the Appellate
Division's order by the Court of Appeals.1 8 While the Court of Ap-
peals has ultimate authority over bar admissions, and the Court has
taken appeals from a number of bar admission denials, there is no
mechanism in the laws or rules regulating admission procedures for
appeal of adverse admission decisions in the Appellate Division. In-
stead, like any other petitioner to the Court, I had to satisfy the
often complex procedural requirements which limit the appealability
of cases to the Court of Appeals.
First, with a few exceptions not relevant here, an appeal to the
Court of Appeals can only be made from a "final" determination of a
lower court."' In addition, I had to establish that the Court of Ap-
peals had statutory jurisdiction to hear the appeal;' that the legal
117. The failure of the Committees or the Appellate Division to warn me that my re-
sponse to Question 21 might be cause for denial may also have violated due process. See
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 261 (1957) ("Serious questions of elemental fair-
ness would be raised if the Committee had excluded [the petitioner] simply because he
failed to answer questions without first explicitly warning him that he could be barred for
this reason alone."); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (noting that the bar
committee had expressly warned the petitioner that he could be denied admission). Of
course, while I was aware that a decision on my application had been delayed because of
my response and expected that the Character Committees or the Appellate Division
might demand an answer to Question 21 or a compromise alternative question, I was not
warned, and did not expect, that the Appellate Division might summarily deny my appli-
cation for not answering the question.
118. See supra note 2 (discussing the Court of Appeals' authority over admission
proceedings).
119. See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PRACTITIONER HANDBOOK FOR APPEAis
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 10 (2d ed. 1991). While finality has no hard and fast definition,
"a judgment disposing of all the issues in an action and either rewarding relief to the
plaintiff or dismissing the complaint is obviously final." Id.
120. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review an Appellate Division order if it
is appealable "as of right" or if permission is granted by either the Appellate Division or
Court of Appeals. An applicant can appeal as of right if the final determination of his or
her application for admission to the bar directly involves substantial issues of either fed-
eral or New York constitutional law. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L & R. § 5601 (b)(1) (McKinney
1992); In re Anonymous, 549 N.E.2d 472, 474 (N.Y. 1989) (Court of Appeals has jurisdic-
tion to review denial of bar admission "to ensur[e] that.., no right of the petitioner has
been violated"); In re Goodman, 92 N.E. 211 (N.Y. 1910). The difficulty may lie in convinc-
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issues raised on appeal had been preserved; 121 and that there were
no issues of fact.122 In particular, I had to demonstrate that there
were no questions of fact regarding my good character or qualifica-
tions to practice law, and that the Appellate Division's denial was
based solely on my assertion of constitutional rights. 2 3 Finally, I had
to demonstrate that the Appellate Division's decision was not dis-
cretionary, a particularly problematic procedural hurdle considering
that the rules of the Court of Appeals vest the Appellate Division
with discretion in determining bar applications. 124 Failure ade-
quately to plead any of these procedural requirements is likely to
foreclose appeal.
ing the Court that the constitutional issue, and not an issue of personal character or legal
qualifications, is the basis of denial. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals is
sought pursuant to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 5602 (McKinney 1992).
121. See, e.g., Telaro v. Telaro, 255 N.E.2d 158, 159-61 (N.Y. 1969).
122. See, e.g., Lue v. English, 376 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 1978); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L & R.
§ 5501(b) (Consol. 1978) (limiting Court of Appeals review, in virtually all cases, to ques-
tions of law).
123. As noted, I had received a favorable admission recommendation from the
Committees on Character and Fitness, and therefore argued that there were no issues
about my character and that I was 'entitled to admission" under N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 9401 (Consol. 1978). One obstacle for me to overcome, however, was the fact that the
Appellate Division, although it did not dispute the Committees' findings with respect to
my character and qualifications, nevertheless characterized its decision as a "finding." See
In re Fieman, No. 6193N (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). But even when a court purports to base
its decision on a "finding" or factual determination, review by the Court of Appeals is still
possible on the ground that the purported finding is not factual but rather an error of law.
See HENRY COHEN & ARTHUR KARGER, THE POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
471 (1992) [hereinafter COHEN & KARGER] ("the court below cannot convert a conclusion
of law into a question of fact by so labeling it").
Moreover, even if there was a factual issue underlying the Appellate Division's order,
the Court of Appeals has authority to review denial of bar admission "to ensur[e] ... that
there is evidence to sustain the decision of the Appellate Division." In re Anonymous, 549
N.E.2d at 474 (N.Y. 1989). See also In re Goodman, 92 N.E. 211 (N.Y. 1910) (with respect
to attorney disbarment); COHEN & KARGER, supra at 452 (in disbarment proceedings, the
Court of Appeals is entitled to 'review any question of law on which the Appellate Divi-
sion's decision is shown to have turned"); In re Kaufman, 157 N.E. 730, 732-34 (N.Y.
1927).
124. See N.Y. RULES OF COURT §§ 520.10(a), 520.10(c) (McKinney 1992) (providing
that the Appellate Division is entitled to condition admission to the Bar on such
"procedures for ascertaining the moral character and general fitness of applicants as it
may deem proper," and to determine that an "applicant possesses the good moral charac-
ter and general fitness requisite for an attorney"). See generally DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW
YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, 822-24 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing reviewability in the Court of Ap-
peals of discretionary lower court decisions).
The Appellate Division, however, has neither the discretion to render an admission
decision based on an error of constitutional law nor to exercise its authority 'on the basis
of plainly impermissible considerations." Barasch v. Micucci, 404 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (N.Y.
1980).
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Confronted with this procedural gauntlet,1' and under the
pressure of professional considerations, I ultimately withdrew my
appeal to the Court of Appeals, renewed my application in the Ap-
pellate Division with an answer to Question 21, and was promptly
admitted to the bar. There is no question that in doing so I com-
promised my strongly-held belief that the question is improper. Un-
fortunately, the lack of adequate procedures within the admission
process for pre-denial hearings and for review of admission denials
not only enhances the vulnerability of bar applicants to arbitrary
governmental action based on Question 21, but makes it likely that
Question 21 will go unchallenged.
CONCLUSION
As one court has stated, "The right to practice law, or to engage
in an occupation requiring a State license, must not be predicated
upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights."126 Yet applicants
for admission to the New York bar routinely must choose between
answering Question 21 and relinquishing their First Amendment
rights to be free from unwarranted state investigation or sanction of
speech and association, and practicing law in New York. While ap-
peal to the Court of Appeals is a possible recourse, the length and
uncertainty of the procedures for obtaining review in the Court of
Appeals make it unlikely that bar applicants will appeal an adverse
admission decision based on Question 21. This enforced election not
only compromises the constitutional rights of bar applicants, but by
demanding that applicants accept unconstitutional state investiga-
tion of their own conduct, Question 21 undermines the very purpose
of the bar admission process of ensuring that attorneys will be sen-
sitive to constitutional issues and practice law conscientiously.'27
Plainly, the New York Legislature, the Court of Appeals, or the
Appellate Division should change the admission application or the
rules of admission. The admission application could be amended to
include the requisite specific intent element. In other words, the
question approved in Wadmond can be reinstated. Alternatively, the
Judiciary Law, the rules of the Court of Appeals, or the rules of the
125. See John R. Starrs, Considerations on Determination of Good Moral Character,
18 U. DET. L.J. 195, 216 n.57 (1955) (for a commentary on the potential delay and frus-
trations of seeking appellate review of adverse bar admission decisions).
126. Cunningham v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 44, 50 (Cal. App. 2d 1986).
127. Further, any examination intended to determine the fitness of bar applicants to
practice law and uphold the constitution which contains a question which is unconstitu-
tional is unlikely to foster respect for the legal institutions responsible for the admission
process. After all, far from setting an example of conscientious attention to constitutional
requirements, Question 21 demonstrates disregard for the Supreme Court's First
Amendment precedents by these institutions.
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Appellate Division departments could be amended to limit the use of
information elicited through Question 21, effectively precluding the
Character Committees and Appellate Division from drawing any ad-
verse inference about an applicant's fitness to practice law from
knowing membership in an organization, regardless of the views it
advocates. Admission regulations would need to provide expressly
that the information could be used only as a preliminary to further
inquiry about the applicant's specific intent while a member of the
organization. Coupled with provisions for a formal hearing prior to
denial, this might be sufficient to satisfy constitutional require-
ments.
Both of these remedies, while perhaps satisfying the letter of
the controlling First Amendment and due process authority, are
nevertheless unsatisfactory when viewed in light of the spirit and
import of those constitutional guarantees. Ideally, questions about
advocacy and past associations should be eliminated entirely from
the admission process. Of course, illegal conduct by a prospective
attorney is a legitimate state concern. That concern, however, is best
met by considering whether an applicant for admission has ever
been convicted of a crime or successfully sued civilly. Even when
limited to investigating an applicant's specific intent, questions
about advocacy and prior associations allow character committees to
probe protected areas of political belief and expression. And while a
state is required to justify denial of an application based on political
belief or action with evidence of specific intent, it is easy to imagine
various pretexts available to state officials for denying an applica-
tion because they disapprove of the applicant's political views, even
though those views are constitutionally protected. Where the proce-
dure for review of bar admission decisions may be protracted and
unpredictable, as in New York, standards for admission should be
far more carefully defined than even Wadmond requires.
For these reasons, Question 21 should be removed from the
New York application for admission to the bar, and all similar in-
quiries into an applicant's exercise of First Amendment rights
should give way to more tolerant practices than those rooted in the
era of Senator Joseph McCarthy.
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